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Abstract 
This study measures competitive conditions in the Ghanaian banking sector, from 2008 to 2012, using data relating 
to the total and the core output of 10 banks in Ghana. The Rosse Penzar H-statistics was derived and it indicated 
that the sector exhibited characteristics of a conjectural variation short run oligopoly. The mergers and acquisitions 
that occurred during the study period did not have any significant effect on competitive conditions in the sector as 
45 per cent of assets in the sector are skewed towards the top five banks at the time.  
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1. Introduction 
The Ghanaian banking sector has gone through a lot of reforms over the years. The 1990s witnessed a couple of 
reforms such as the Financial Sector Reform Programme (FINSAP), which led to the liberalisation of interest rates, 
abolishing of directed credits, privatization of state owned banks, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market 
and the beginning of a capital market with the establishment of the Ghana stock exchange in 1990. The period 
2008 to 2012 also saw some reforms after a successful redenomination of the cedi in 2007.  
The banking sector however continue to operate in a high interest rate environment for the best part of 
2012 supported by governments demand for liquidity leading to high treasury bill rates in 2012, averaging a little 
over 22%. This has led to phenomenal growth in the banking sector. The growth suggests the global financial crisis 
did not have severe impact on the Ghanaian banking industry (Ghana Banking Survey 2009). In the light of this 
significant growth it will be very important to know how competitive conditions in the Ghanaian banking sector 
have changed during the period of growth between 2008 and 2012. 
Econometric techniques will be employed to examine the nature of competitive conditions in the 
Ghanaian banking sector during the period 2008 to 2012. Using data relating to the total and the core output of the 
banks, separate estimates of the Rosse-Panzar H-statistics will be derived. 
 
2. Literature review 
Few studies have attempted to measure competitive conditions in the Ghanaian Banking sector. Buchs, and 
Mathisen (2005), using a 1998-2003 panel data set discovered evidence of non-competitive market structure in the 
Ghanaian banking sector. They suggested that, high profit ratios and high cost structure of Ghanaian banks could 
indicate a monopolistic banking sector. Other studies have described the Ghanaian Banking sector as operating 
under perfect conditions indicating no evidence of a change in competition as a result of liberalization between 
1988 and 2011 (Owusu-Antwi,  & Antwi, 2013).  
Biekpe, (2011), also investigated the degree of bank competition and intermediation efficiency in Ghana. 
He concluded that there is a non-competitive market structure in the Ghanaian banking system from the year 2000 
to 2007, a reflection of a monopolistic competitive banking system.  
Lower economic profit reduces the incentives of banks to self-restrain from taking risk (Salas and Saurina, 
2003). However in 2010 the banking sector in Ghana saw high growths as a result of capital injection by banks to 
meet the minimum regulatory capital requirements in 2012. This is believed to improve buffer for risk absorption 
in the banking sector (Ghana banking survey, 2013). There has however been some few acquisition over the period 
with Ecobank Ghana Limited (EBG) and Access Bank Ghana Limited (ABG) acquiring The Trust Bank Limited 
(TTB) and Intercontinental Bank Ghana Limited (IBG) respectively.  
Table 1: Concentration Ratios and HHI for the biggest two and biggest five banks (asset based) 
Year/Measure CR2 CR5 HHI 
2008 0.295 0.523 773.36 
2009 0.244 0.499 697.26 
2010 0.220 0.456 616.44 
2011 0.220 0.462 623.98 
2012 0.234 0.459 622.96 
Source: Ghana Banking Survey, 2009-2013  
The table above shows the CR (concentration ratios) and HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) from the 
period 2008 to 2012. The evidence suggests concentration has been reducing over the years under review. Even 
though the overall the result suggests the banking sector in Ghana was un-concentrated over the study period, the 
fall in concentration has been quite significant over the period from an HHI of 773.36 in 2008 to 622.96 in 2012. 
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The Mergers and acquisition in 2012 however led to an insignificant decrease in concentration from an HHI of 
623.98 in 2011 to 622.96 in 2012. The HHI index is one of the ways of analysing competitive effects of bank 
mergers. It is widely used because of its importance “to market concentration as an indicator of competition and 
ease in calculating it” (Rhoades, 1993). Squaring the market shares of all firms in a market and then summing the 
squares calculates the HHI. 
 
3. Methodology 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm has been used to examine the market structure of the 
banking sector over the years. This assumes an exogenous nature of the banking sector and a regression between 
profitability on concentration ratios and a number of control variables. This approach usually shows a positive 
relationship between profitability and concentration ratio indicating that banks in concentrated markets exercised 
market power. Others also use the Efficient – Structure hypothesis (ESH) in examining the market structure of the 
banking sector. However this approach indicates that large banks are more profitable than small banks because 
large banks tend to be more efficient (Berger, 1995; Berger and Humphrey, 1997, cited by Matthews, Murinde, 
and Zhao, 2007). 
The SCP or the ESH is not sufficient in explaining bank profitability. Thus they both focus on profitability 
than the deviation of output price from marginal cost, which is the more desired way of analysing competitive 
conditions (Paul, 1999, cited by Matthews, et al., 2007). The Rosse Panzar reduced – form revenue model and the 
Brernahan and Lau mark-up model are the two most popular approaches in this strand of literature.  
Recently the use of dynamic models to estimate competition has also gained grounds. An example to this 
effect is the study by Godard and Wilson (2009). Godard and Wilson identified implications of the H-Statistic of 
misspecification bias in the revenue equation, arising when adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial and 
not instantaneous. They prescribe a dynamic formulation of the revenue equation for accurate identification of the 
H-Statistic. 
Partial adjustment necessitates the inclusion of lagged dependent variable among covariates of the 
revenue equation. This will make the revenue equation have a dynamic structure thus the static version without a 
lagged dependent variable, used in previous studies is misspecified. Applying an appropriate dynamic panel 
estimator to a correctly specified dynamic revenue equation permits virtually unbiased estimation of the H-Statistic. 
It enables the researcher to assess the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium directly through the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Godard and Wilson, 2009). 
This study uses models similar to that of Matthews, Murinde and Zhao rather than the dynamic panel 
model employed by Godard and Wilson. Thus using Rosse-Panzar H-statistic for ten (10) banks, which is robust 
in small samples than the Brernahan and Lau mark-up model (Shaffer, 2004, cited by Matthews, et al., 2007). On 
the other hand, employing a dynamic panel model to this study with a small sample (N) and time period (T) will 
lead to no valid observations after removing cross sections with estimation errors. Also a condition for running a 
dynamic panel model is a test for cointegration among variables used. With a small N and T there will be 
insufficient number of observation to conduct a panel cointegration test. 
Table 2: Interpretation of the H - Statistic (Rosse - Penzar) 
Equilibrium test 
E = 0 Equilibrium 
E < 0 Disequilibrium 
  
Competitive Conditions 
H ≤ 0 Monopoly or conjectural short-run oligopoly. 
H = 1 Perfect competition or natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable  
 market or sales maximising firm subject to break even constraint 
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic competition 
Source: Hondroyiannis, Lolos, & Papapetrou (1999). 
The banks were sampled from a population of 26 class one banks in Ghana. Data was sourced from 
Bankscope, the Ghana Banking Survey and the Annual Reports of individual banks. The sampled banks include 
the top five banks in Ghana as at 2012. All regressions were estimated with the Eviews software. The equations to 
be estimated are as follows: 
           (1) 
 
           (2) 
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           (3) 
Where REV= Ratio of bank operating income to total assets; PL= Personnel expenses to employees; PK= 
capital expenses to fixed assets; PF= Ratio of annual interest expenses to total loanable funds; RISKASS= Ratio 
of provisions to total assets, a measure of the riskiness of the banks overall portfolio; ASSET= Total assets, a 
proxy for size; BR= Ratio of the number of branches of each bank to the total number of branches for all banks; 
GROWTH= GDP growth rate; INTREV= Interest Income as a fraction of total assets; ROAA= Return on average 
assets. The subscripts i and t denotes number of banks and time respectively. ε_it and μ_it denotes a one-way error 
component. 
Equation (1) and (2) are models of competitive conditions in the Ghanaian banking sector. The H – 
Statistics is given by H = !1+ !2+ !3. Equation (3) is a model of the equilibrium condition. The banking sector 
will be in equilibrium if E = !1
"+ !2
"+ !3
"  = 0 (Matthews, et al., 2007). 
 
4. Empirical analysis and results 
The reduced form functions have as the dependent variables both the logarithm of revenue (operating income) and 
interest income as a ratio of total assets as described in equation (1) and (2). Operating income includes non-
interest income and interest income. Table 3 shows the regression output for equation (3).  
With the exception of the measure of riskiness of the banks overall portfolio (RISKASSETS), which is 
significant at both 5% and 10% significant level but not significant at 1%, most of the explanatory variables in 
Table 3 where not significant. A test on the null hypothesis that the parameters on these explanatory variables are 
not significant was conducted using the Wald test (Appendix Table 1). This indicated that the null cannot be 
rejected because the p-value of the F-test was greater than 0.05 (0.5484) (Brooks, 2008). The explanatory variables 
together where significant in explaining the dependent variable, this is evident in the Probability F-statistic 
(0.025249) which is significant at 5% and 10% significant level in Table 3.  
Table 3: Regression output for equations (1), (2) and (3) 
  Dependent Variable 
Explanatory Variables LNROAA LNREV LNINTREV 
C -2.473902 -0.622937 0.158082 
 (0.848708) (-0.758564) (0.124524) 
LNPL -0.155925 0.070061 0.09593 
 (-0.555866) (1.270864) (1.125642) 
LNPK 0.186271 0.024721 0.001192 
 (1.228319) (0.606801) (0.01892) 
LNPF -0.236289 -0.16729 -0.276631 
 (-1.49766) (-3.810771)*** (-4.076318)*** 
LNRISKASSETS -0.324533 0.070184 0.064672 
 (-2.624007)** (2.194649)** (1.308191) 
LNASSETS 0.130285 -0.10858 -0.196124 
 (0.593745) (-1.8076)* (-2.112064)** 
LNBR -0.216845 0.135879 0.332516 
 (-1.175118) (2.690381)** (4.258905)*** 
GROWTH -0.027947 -0.017134 -0.035744 
 (0.952887) (-2.186771)** (-2.951114)*** 
p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.10* 
T-statistics in parenthesis () 
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
Table 3 also shows the regression output for equation (1) and (2), with the log of operating income 
(LNREV) and net interest income (LNINTREV) as dependent variables respectively. In the Table above, the unit 
price of funds (PF) was very significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. The variable LNRISKASSETS is 
significant at 5% and 10% significant level. The positive effect of RISKASSETS, the riskiness of the bank overall 
portfolio, supports the argument that higher risk commands a higher compensation return. The effect of LNBR on 
revenue indicates the increased cost of maintaining a higher branch network (Matthews, et al., 2007). GROWTH 
is significant in explaining the dependent variables REV and INTREV. 
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Table 4: Test for equilibrium and H-statistics 
Test of equilibrium dependent variable LNROAA   
Period LNPL LNPK LNPF Sum E H0: Sum=0 
2008-2012 -0.1559 0.18627 -0.2363 -0.2059 Prob-F(1, 38) = 0.6121 
      
H-statistics dependent variable LNREV     
Period LNPL LNPK LNPF Sum H H0: Sum=1 
2008-2012 0.07006 0.02472 -0.1673 -0.0725 Prob-F(1, 42) = 0.0000 
      
H-statistics dependent variable LNINTREV     
Period LNPL LNPK LNPF Sum H H0: Sum=1 
2008-2012 0.09593 0.00119 -0.2766 -0.1795 Prob-F(1, 42) = 0.0000 
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
The test for equilibrium in equation (3) indicates the banking sector in Ghana was not in equilibrium 
during the study period. A test on the null hypothesis that the parameters on these three variables are jointly zero 
(E=0) was not rejected over the sample period. This is shown in Table 4 above, where the Prob-F (1, 38) = 0.6121 
greater than 0.05 (Brooks, 2008).  
The sum of the input price elaticities in both equation (1) and (2) shows that, the H-statistics is less than 
zero. Indicating a conjectural variations short-run oligopoly. This was confirmed by rejecting the restriction that 
H=1 as the p-values were very significant. A stability test (CUSUM of Squares) conducted on the parameters 
indicated that the null of stability is rejected (Appendix Figure 1, 2 and 3).  
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine whether using a different size of test alters the 
conclusion. Size of test was determined at 10%, 5% and 1%. For this study the P-value is useful since it does not 
require the specifying of an arbitrary significance level (Brooks, 2008). Jointly the explanatory variables in 
equation (1) and (2) were significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significant level indicating that the conclusion of rejecting 
the null will be the same even if the size of the test is altered (see Table 3). The explanatory variables in equation 
(3), were however only significant at 5% and 10% significant level, but not significant at 1%. This indicates that 
the conclusion of rejecting the null will not hold if the size of the test is altered to 1% significant level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study measured the nature of competitive conditions among Ghanaian banks during 2008 – 2012. The sample 
period covered an era of growth and bank mergers and acquisition in Ghana. The evidence from the Rosse-Penzar 
statistics suggests that the Ghanaian banking sector operates as a conjectural variation short-run oligopoly as on 
average 45% of assets in the banking sector is controlled by the top 5 banks over the sample period. These findings 
are consistent with Buchs, and Mathissen, (2005) who attributed this to persistent domestic financing needs of the 
government – limiting competition between banks. The significance of LNBR indicates that the number of 
branches that a bank has influences the bank specific revenue and this relationship is positive. A common element 
is the relative explanatory power of the price of funds in both cases. 
An interesting avenue for further research will be to increase the sample size and the study period and to 
apply a dynamic panel model to see whether the conclusion reached will be sustained.  
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Appendix 
       
     Figure 1: Stability test on LNREV                      Figure 2: Stability test on LNROAA 
 Source: Bankscope and authors estimate              Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
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Figure 3: Stability test on LNINTREV 
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
 
Table 1: Parameter Estimates for ROAA 
Wald Test: ROAA     
Equation: Untitled   
    
Test Statistic Value   df Probability 
    
F-statistic 0.812161 (5, 38) 0.5484 
Chi-square 4.060803 5 0.5407 
    
    
Null Hypothesis Summary:   
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
C(2)  -0.15593 0.280508 
C(3)  0.186271 0.151647 
C(6)  0.130285 0.219428 
C(7)  -0.21685 0.184531 
C(8)  -0.02795 0.029329 
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.   
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
Table 2: Competitive condition test on LNREV 
Wald Test:       
Equation: Untitled   
    
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
t-statistic -12.60633 42 0.0000 
F-statistic 158.9196 (1, 42) 0.0000 
Chi-square 158.9196 1 0.0000 
    
    
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=1  
Null Hypothesis Summary:   
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
-1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) -1.07251 0.085077 
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.   
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
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Table 3: Competitive condition test on LNINTREV 
Wald Test:       
Equation: Untitled   
    
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
t-statistic -8.968363 42 0.0000 
F-statistic 80.43154 (1, 42) 0.0000 
Chi-square 80.43154 1 0.0000 
    
    
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=1  
Null Hypothesis Summary:   
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
-1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) -1.1795 0.131519 
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.   
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
 
Table 4: Equilibrium test on LNROAA  
Wald Test:       
Equation: Untitled   
    
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
t-statistic -0.511312 38 0.6121 
F-statistic 0.26144 (1, 38) 0.6121 
Chi-square 0.26144 1 0.6091 
    
    
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary:   
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
C(2) + C(3) + C(4) -0.2059 0.402773 
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.   
Source: Bankscope and authors estimate 
 
